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During an Executive Session on July 20, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected by voice vote the Administration's proposal, S. 1936, to establish an American Council for International Communications, Inc., for the purpose of providing from public appropriations grant support to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Instead, the Committee reported out, also by voice vote, Senator Case's original proposal, S. 18, which amends P.L. 402, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, to authorize the Department of State to "provide, under such terms and conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate," for FY-1972 to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. We do not expect action on the floor of the Senate on this proposal before the August recess, but we do expect a hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee whose Chairman, Representative Thomas Morgan, has introduced our bill as H.R. 9637.

The deliberations in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee illustrate the line Senator Fulbright is taking in his endeavor to terminate the radios. (It is worth noting that he voted against both S. 1936 and S. 18) However, in view of substantial pro-radio sentiment in the Committee, he has been maneuvering, successfully so

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far, to link them to the State Department and/or USIA on the assumption that foreign diplomatic and/or Appropriations Committee action will cause them to be rapidly emasculated when they are forced into such a relationship. The uninspired sponsorship of our legislation by Senator Case (who was given two judgeships just before the vote) and the unwillingness of Senator Javits to demand a roll-call vote so that the proxies he carried could be used, allowed Senator Fulbright's strategy to succeed. Nevertheless, over Fulbright's negative vote, the Committee did back grants to the radios which, if it is sustained, will keep them going for another year.

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The next day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's American desk officer during an exchange with our DCM presented a statement calling the US move "an unfriendly act which clearly contradicts declarations by the Government of the USA about its desire to develop Soviet-American relations in a positive direction." This approach comes on the heels of several others, a formal memorandum given us by the Poles on May 26 calling for abolition of RFE, a follow-up oral request to the Under Secretary by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz on June 4, an oral demarche by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev on July 2

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to our Ambassador, and a low-key statement by Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy to Ambassador Puhan on July 13 calling RFE an "irritant" in relations.

A basic problem in the current Administration approach is that the distinction we are trying to make between the methods of financing the radios are, for the most part, lost on members of Congress and to a certain degree, on the Soviet-bloc governments. Without strong top-level pressures, even favorably disposed legislators do not appear willing to stand up to determined Committee Chairmen such as Fulbright and Ellender over the question of the method of financing nongovernmental broadcasting, once they have assured the substance is secure and will be funded. In addition, despite administration commitments to return annually for Congressional authorization, opponents such as Fulbright are able to argue that the Administration bill sets up a new and possibly self-perpetuating "bureaucracy" which could be "misused" (the implication is "misuse" by CIA or other executive-branch agencies, whereas the more real possibility is Congressional misuse). Furthermore, some may argue, not unconvincingly, that once public financing of any kind is provided, the U.S. Government can be taxed with the responsibility for each broadcast no matter what the method

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or financing channel may be. The additional advantage which the State Department and/or USIA achieve in deflecting such protests, if they are not in the funding channel, is not, in the opinion of many legislators, an issue worth making a stand-up fight about. The idea that the appropriation may be more secure if it is not annually considered with the State or USIA budget is, of course, not even worth making with them.

In this situation, the Administration is faced with a number of options, each of which has both foreign and domestic political ramifications:

1. It could settle for S. 18 and go along with funding the radios through the Department of State, a course which would create the least publicity about the issue during the immediate future. However, it is our estimate that even though we might distance the diplomatic establishment somewhat by using an advisory committee or contracting supervision to an independent body, diplomatic complaints about the broadcasts would be more difficult to ignore and appropriations would be more difficult to obtain once the Department was directly in the funding channel. There might be a serious question whether, if 1972 is marked by substantial high-level diplomatic activity in a "detente" atmosphere, authorization

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and appropriations for FY-1973 operations could be obtained without a strong effort in Congress by Congressional leaders who are receptive to White House arguments. It should be understood under this option that, for reasons of personnel training, the same CIA team which has been guiding the radios to date would have to be relied on (under its present or other colors). It would not be possible practically to organize and train another team to go into action much before the end of FY-1972 if, as expected, the legislation (S. 18) is not finally passed until late this fall. Furthermore, the job of organizing a new team under such dubious year-to-year conditions as S.18 would provide would be difficult.

2. It could press in the House for S. 1936 (H.R. 1637), or its slightly altered version in the House, (H.R. 9330), which meets various concerns of Senator Case and Representative Reid, hoping to obtain a strong vote on the House floor before action on the Senate floor. If this were successful, a fight could be made on the Senate floor, if the White House were willing to engage the leadership against S. 18 and for our proposal. If ^{were not made or if it} such an effort/failed, which is conceivable given the rather technical difference being argued, another effort could be made in Conference. This might have some pros-

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pects of success if it occurred after the GAO and Legislative Reference Service studies Senator Fulbright has commissioned are completed, provided they reflect as well as we expect on the radios. There is a risk, however, that Fulbright would dominate such a conference and successfully impose the S. 18 solution. This lengthy procedure might put us into a last-minute situation in going to the Appropriations Committees, a circumstance which might prevent adequate consideration of the radios' financial needs.

3. It could present the Administration proposal in the House, but fall back to a situation of accepting the S. 18-approach, provided this involved a two-year authorization. It could then try, on the Senate floor, to achieve the same thing by amendment, the purpose being to avoid another damaging discussion of the radios during the election year. Such a strategy might be made to fit with the expected desire of some members (Fascell, D., Florida) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to take a look at all U.S. radio assets in Europe with a view to their management in a new form, a project which would require at least 18 months, but could produce, if Congressmen and Senators were involved, a better understanding of the whole subject. However, if the Administration

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is obliged to accept the arrangement provided by S. 18 for 18 months, it will prove difficult to move on to the preferable Council-type arrangement once the radios have survived that long under the S. 18 format.

4. It could deliberately engage on behalf of options 2 or 3 the current considerable Jewish pressure in the U.S. for Yiddish broadcasts to the USSR by taking the following posture: a) maintenance of the stand against official VOA broadcasting in Yiddish; b) a suggestion to the pressure groups that they apply to Radio Liberty; c) a suggestion to Radio Liberty that it agree to limited broadcasting in Yiddish, naturally on the condition that RL stays alive, an achievement best assured by passage of S. 1936 (H.R. 9637, or H.R. 9330). If the Jewish groups found such a quasi-official symbol an acceptable substitute for the official symbol they are seeking--which is not at all certain--they could put the considerable Jewish lobby squarely behind our efforts in Congress, possibly reducing the amount of Presidential leadership required on this issue. The drawback would be that this would be seen by the Soviets as a rather sharp reply to the protest against the radios they made July 23 to our DCM in Moscow. Also, it would quickly evoke appeals by the Baltic-American groups for equal treatment, i.e. Baltic-language broadcasts on Radio Liberty. The

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continuation of Baltic-language broadcasts on VOA might, however, enable us to stall this latter effort.

Recommendation:

Among the options presented above it is our recommendation that we proceed along the lines of option No. 2 attempting to get as strong an endorsement as we can in the House of our proposal. To proceed in this direction, we would need:

- 1) Specific White House approval and backing for Option No. 2;
- 2) Authorization and instruction by the White House to its Legislative Liaison ^{work for} to delay ^{of} a full Senate vote on the RFE/RL legislation until after we have results in the House;
- 4) Authorization to apply the supporting strategy outlined in option no. 4, maintaining our refusal of VOA Yiddish broadcasts but suggesting the possibility on RL; and
- 3) Direct White House support with the leadership in the House once our proposal is reported out of Committee in acceptable form.

Following a favorable result in the House as a whole, hopefully before the end of September, we would then consult again as to the advisability of making a serious fight

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on the Senate floor or the possibility of obtaining a
viable result in Conference after a token exposition of
our views to the Senate.

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OLC 71-0729

Radios ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. OLC

2.

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14.

15.

Told
we had no
problems until
the end that
my personal
opinion was un-
less 3/19/36 is
passed this time
around the Radios
have had it

ah yes!

FORM
3-62

610 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

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